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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SINGLE HIRING DECISIONS AND MUNICIPAL
ENTITIES: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S LATEST SAFEGUARD
AGAINST MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983. BOARD OF THE
COUNTYCOMM'RS V.BROWN, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).
I. INTRODUCTION

Since its first major interpretation in Monroe v. Pape,' 42 U.S.C. § 19832
has developed into'an extremely vast and complex body of law.' The rapid
increase in the number of § 1983 suits filed has aided this evolution. Since the
landmark case of Monell v. Departmentof Social Services,5 some of the most6
difficult cases in this area have dealt with questions regarding municipal
liability under § 1983. 7
The United States Supreme Court restricted municipal liability under §
1983 through its recent decision in Board of the County Commissioners v.

1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruledby Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978). For further discussion of Monroe, see infra Part III.C.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
3. See CHARLES R. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND CIVIL

RIGHTS ACTIONS INTHE FEDERAL COURTS § 4:0, at 4-2 (2d ed. 1996). Due to § 1983's
expansive coverage and the competing judicial awareness of federalism concerns, § 1983
litigation has grown increasingly intricate. See id.
4. See 1A MARTIN A. SCHwARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 1.1, at 3 (3d ed. 1997).
In 1961, only 270 federal civil rights lawsuits were filed as compared to the present day in
which 40,000 to 50,000 similar lawsuits are filed every year in federal courts. See id.
5. 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). For further discussion of Monell, see infra Part III.C.
6. A municipality is defined as:
A legally incorporated or duly authorized association of inhabitants of limited area
for local governmental or other public purposes. A body politic created by the
incorporation of the people of a prescribed locality invested with subordinate
powers of legislation to assist in the civil government of the state and to regulate and
administer local and internal affairs of the community. A city, borough, town,
township, or village. Also, the body of officers taken collectively, belonging to a
city, who are appointed to manage its affairs and defend its interests. Political
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a [s]tate.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
7. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: BalancingFederalism Concerns and
MunicipalAccountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539 (1989).
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Brown.' In a five to four decision, 9 the Supreme Court held that for a
municipality to be liable for a single hiring decision under the deliberate
indifference standard, a plaintiff must show that a municipal employee violated
the plaintiffs constitutional rights and that the specific constitutional violation
was a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision.l°
This note will begin with an analysis of the material facts and case history
of the Brown decision in Part II. Part III provides a general background of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 that specifically focuses on the complex and intricate legal
doctrines of municipal liability under the statute. Finally, after Part IV
examines the reasoning of the Court's decision in Brown, including the
majority's opinion and two dissenting opinions, the note will address the
significance of the case in Part V.
H. SUMMARY OF FACTS

After a visit to Grayson County, Texas, respondent Jill Brown and her
husband Todd began the return trip home to Bryan County, Oklahoma, during
the early hours of May 12, 1991." After crossing the Texas-Oklahoma border,
Brown and her husband, who was driving, approached a police checkpoint
operated by Bryan County Deputy Sheriff Robert Morrison and Reserve
Deputy Stacy Bums.'2 Todd and Jill Brown turned their vehicle around in the
middle of the road and retreated from the checkpoint. 3 In response to the
8. 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997). For discussion regarding how Brown has affected municipal
liability under § 1983, see infra Part V.
9. The majority opinion of the Court was written by Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. See id. at 1386 (Souter J.
dissenting). Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer.
See id. at 1394 (Breyer J. dissenting). Justice Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. See id. at 1401.
10. See id. at 1392. For further discussion of the Court's reasoning in Brown, see infra
Part IV.
11. See Board of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1386 (1997);
Petitioner's Brief at 5, Board of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997) (No.
95-1100) (citations omitted).
12. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1386. At the time of this incident, Reserve Deputy Stacy
Bums had been a Bryan County law enforcement officer for only six days. See David G.
Savage, High Court Restricts Damages for Brutality; Police: Justices Rule, 5-4, Local
Governments Can'tBe Held Liable in Most Cases Under U.S. Law for Injuries Inflicted by an
Officer. Impact in CaliforniaIs Considered Uncertain., L.A. TIMEs, April 29, 1997, at Al.
13. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1386. The reasons for the Browns' reversal in direction were
disputed. The petitioners claimed that Todd Brown wished to avoid harassment which he had
experienced in the past as well as prevent the officers from discovering a loaded rifle and a
concealed revolver. See Petitioner's Brief at 5-6, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted).
However, the respondent contended that they were familiar with the checkpoint due to previous
encounters, and they decided to return to her mother-in-law's home in Texas for the night. See
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Browns' retreat, Morrison and Bums pursued at speeds exceeding one hundred
miles per hour.' 4 Once the chase had ended, Morrison drew his revolver and
ordered the Browns to exit their vehicle. 5 Bums subsequently ordered Mrs.
Brown to exit the vehicle on two occasions, and both times she failed to obey. 16
Burns then used an arm bar technique to remove Brown from the pickup and
force her to the ground. 7 As a result, she suffered extensive damage to both
knees."
Brown then sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against
Bryan County, Sheriff B.J. Moore, Deputy Robert Morrison, and Reserve
Deputy Stacy Bums.' 9 Although the district court granted summary judgment
to Moore and Morrison, it denied like motions by Burns and Bryan County.2 °
The crux of her claim against Bryan County was two-fold: first, the County

Respondent's Brief at 5-6 n.6, Board of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997)
(No. 95-1100) (citations omitted).
14. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1386. Again, there was a dispute as to the manner in which
the Browns reversed their direction away from the checkpoint. Bryan County asserted that "the
Browns' truck fishtailed, its tires squealing, and left the checkpoint at a high rate of speed
toward the Denison dam." Petitioner's Brief at 6, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted).
The respondent claimed the truck's tires never squealed and that they did not flee at a high rate
of speed. See Respondent's Brief at 6 n.6, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted).
15. SeeBrown, 117 S. Ct. at 1386.
16. See id. As to Morrison's order to exit, respondent claimed that she did not hear the
order. See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted). Bums claimed that
Brown was reaching for a gun. See Bernard Mower & Barbara Yuill, Opening of Supreme
Court Term Shows Renewed Interest in Workplace Issues, EMPL. POL'Y & L. DAILY (BNA),
Oct. 4, 1996, at D-2. Regarding Bums's two orders, Brown leaned forward with outstretched
hands; yet, she claimed that she was not reaching for anything and that she was attempting to
obey Bums's orders. See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted).
Although the Browns never faced criminal charges, officers on the scene removed a loaded rifle
and a concealed handgun from the vehicle after ordering the Browns to vacate their truck. See
Savage, supra note 12, at Al; Petitioner's Brief at 7, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted).
17. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1386-87. The arm bar technique was executed by "grabbing
respondent's arm at the wrist and elbow, pulling her from the vehicle, and spinning her to the
ground." Id. at 1386-87. Petitioner claimed that the level of force was the "'lowest level of
force' an officer can employ short of purely oral persuasion." Petitioner's Brief at 7, Brown
(No. 95-1100) (citations omitted).
18. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1387. After her encounter with Bums, Brown was unable
to walk without assistance for one year. See Green Light for Brutality, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
April 29, 1997, at 36A. Brown underwent four corrective knee surgeries, but she may require
replacement surgery due to the substantial damage she received upon impact with the ground.
See JusticesLimit Suit Against Countyfor Negligent Hiringof Police Officer, EMPL. POL'Y &
L. DAILY (BNA), April 30, 1997, at D-2; see also Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1387.
19. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1387; Petitioner's Brief at 8, Brown (No. 95-1100). Brown
claimed that Bums's actions amounted to excessive force which violated her constitutional
rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. See Petitioner's Brief at 8, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted).
20. See Petitioner's Brief at 8, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted).
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failed to adequately train Bums; 2' and second, Sheriff Moore, the party
responsible for hiring Bums, inadequately screened Bums's application and
record.22 Regarding the inadequate screening, Stacy Bums had a string of
misdemeanors and driving infractions on his record including public drunkenness, resisting arrest, and assault and battery prior to his employment with
Bryan County.2 3 At the time of Bums's hiring, Oklahoma statutory law only
prohibited the hiring of previous felons for police officer positions.24 Moore
revealed at trial that although he had acquired a copy of Bums's record from
the National Crime Information Center, he had not reviewed the record
carefully.25
During the trial in district court, Bryan County stipulated that Moore was
the official policymaker 26 for matters concerning the Sheriff's Department of
Bryan County.27 On two separate occasions, Bryan County moved for
judgment as a matter of law. 2' Bryan County argued that it could not be held
liable under § 1983 for a single hiring decision by the official policymaker.29
The court denied both motions. 30 At the trial's conclusion, the jury found
against Bryan County on both the inadequate screening and inadequate training
claims and against Bums for his use of excessive force.3'
21. See id.
22. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1387. It is interesting to note that Bums was the son of

Moore's nephew. See id.
23. See id.; Petitioner's Brief at 3, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted). Bums fought
with members of a fraternity's pledge class when one of them hit Bums's car at the University
of Oklahoma. See Petitioner's Brief at 3, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted). After the
accident, Bums plead guilty to numerous misdemeanors including assault and battery, public
drunkenness, and possession of a false identification as well as other traffic offenses. See id.
at 3-4.
24. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1387. Oklahoma law provided:
No person shall be certified as a police or peace officer in this state unless the
employing agency has reported to the Council that.., the Oklahoma State Bureau
of Investigation and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have reported that such
person has no record of a conviction of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3311 (D)(2)(a) (West 1989).
25. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1387. During cross-examination, Moore admitted that he had
not noticed the assault or public drunkenness convictions. See Respondent's Brief at 2, Brown

(No. 95-1100) (citations omitted); Petitioner's Brief at 4, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations
omitted). His reason for his omissions was that "[Bums] had a long record." Respondent's
Brief at 2, Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted).
26. See infra Part III.C for discussion regarding the terms policy and policymaker as used
in § 1983 cases.
27. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1387 (citations omitted).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.

31. See id. The actual damages assessed against Bums and the County were as follows:
"$711,302 in actual damages, $87,500 in attorneys' fees, and $20,000 in punitive damages."
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.32 The court
refused to disturb the jury's verdict regarding the § 1983 inadequate training
claim.33 In addressing the inadequate hiring claim under § 1983, the court held
that a reasonable jury could have found that allowing an unqualified candidate
to administer forcible arrests was the cause
who had a propensity for violence
34
of the respondent's injuries.
The United States Supreme Court granted Bryan County's writ of
certiorari to decide whether a single hiring decision by a municipality's
policymaker can give rise to an inadequate screening claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. 35 The Court held that such a decision does not necessarily rise to the
level of deliberate indifference 36 necessary to impose § 1983 liability on a
municipality.3 7
I. BACKGROUND
Part IH.A will begin with a review of the historical origin of 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Part .B will provide an overview of litigation under § 1983. Finally,
Part III.C will analyze the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence
regarding municipal liability under § 1983.
A.

Historical Origin of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

At the conclusion of the Civil War, the mandated emancipation of slaves
did not necessarily guarantee their safety.38 Congress sought to protect the
newly freed slaves by ratifying the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments.39 These amendments failed to prevent various acts of violence

Petitioner's Brief at 9, Brown (No. 95-1 100) (citations omitted).
32. See Brown v. Bryan County, Okla., 67 F.3d 1174, 1185 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated,
Board of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997). Although the parties
appealed many issues to the Fifth Circuit, only rulings regarding the § 1983 claims are relevant
for the purpose of this analysis. See generally Brown, 67 F.3d 1174 (5th Cir. 1995).
33. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1387 (citations omitted); see also Petitioner's Brief at 9-10,
Brown (No. 95-1100) (citations omitted).
34. See Brown, 67 F.3d at 1185. "IT]he policymaker's (Sheriff Moore's) single action of
hiring Bums without an adequate review of his background directly caused the constitutional
violations of which Mrs. Brown now complains." Id.
35. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1387 (citations omitted).
36. See infra Parts III.C and IV for discussion regarding the term "deliberate indifference"
as used in § 1983 cases.
37. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1394.
38. See Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 547.
39. See Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 546-47. The Thirteenth Amendment was adopted in
1866, the Fourteenth in 1868, and the Fifteenth in 1870. See Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 546-47.
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against the emancipated citizens by such groups as the Ku Klux Klan;40
furthermore, state and local officials either participated in the Ku Klux Klan or
failed to bring Klan members to justice for their acts of terrorism.4 As a result
of Congress's distrust of the southern states,42 Congress enacted the Civil4
Rights Act of 186643 pursuant to section two of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was constitutionally questionable; therefore, the
Forty-second Congress looked to the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of
remedial power. 5 The result was the adoption of section one of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 46 now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 47
The purpose and language of section two of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
served as the model for section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871; both
sections attempted to prevent constitutional deprivations under color of state
law.4 s By creating a procedural mechanism for both compensatory and
injunctive actions, the legislation signaled the growing protective role of the
federal government and its intrusion upon state sovereignty.
Although enacted in 1871, another ninety years would pass before § 1983
became a widely used litigation tool.5 Much of this can be attributed to the
Supreme Court's narrow reading of the term "under color of state law" that in
turn limited § 1983's effectiveness. 5' Such limitations eventually gave way as
40. See Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 547.
41. See Gerhardt, supranote 7, at 547. See also Steven S. Cushman, MunicipalLiability
Under § 1983: Toward a New Definition of MunicipalPolicymaker, 34 B.C. L. REV. 693, 694
(1993).
42. See Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 547. Congress distrusted the southern states because
although such actions of terrorism were rampant, the states did little to protect the emancipated
slaves. See Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 547.
43. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
44. See Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 546-47. Section two of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
"provided criminal penalties for the deprivation of civil rights by persons acting 'under color
of any law."' Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 546 (quoting The Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 2, 14
Stat. 27 (1866)).
45. See Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 546.
46. 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
47. See Cushman, supra note 41, at 694.
48. See Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 548. For discussion regarding "under color of state
law," see infra Part III.B.2.
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; IA SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.3, at 10. The generally
accepted goals underlying the Civil Rights Act of 1871 are as follows: one, to deter terroristic
groups such as the Ku Klux Klan from violating the constitutional rights of citizens; two, to
provide a federal remedy in the event constitutional rights were violated by someone acting
under color of state law; three, to provide compensation to plaintiffs deprived of their federally
protected rights; and four, to reassert the goals of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gerhardt,
supranote 7, at 548.
50. See RiCHEY, supra note 3, § 4:0, at4-1.
51. See Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 549. For an extensive discussion of the first ninety
years' development of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 549-5 1.
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the political tide turned, 2 and during the mid-twentieth century, the stage was
set for the complex development and expansive usage of § 1983."
B.

Overview of Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
1.

FunctionalRole of the Statute

The practical role of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to provide a vehicle for
plaintiffs who have suffered federal constitutional or statutory deprivations to
bring their claims before the courts. 4 A plaintiff cannot assert a general
violation of § 1983 because the statute conveys no substantive rights. 5 The
sole purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to create a doorway to the courts for
plaintiffs to enforce their constitutionally
guaranteed rights; 56 thus, § 1983 is
57
nature.
in
simply procedural
2.

Elements of a Cause ofAction Under the Statute

Section 1983 requires the proof of two elements: one, that the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and
two, that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of federal constitutional or
statutory rights. s State and local officials exercising their official powers
clearly act under color of state law,5 9 while officials undertaking purely private
acts or acting pursuant to federal law will not be considered to have acted under

52. See Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 550-51. "[T]he 'nationalists,' who favored a strong
federal government, and the 'federalists,' who favored state sovereignty, engaged in a tug of
war over the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on state autonomy." Gerhardt, supra note
7, at 550. Through various decisions, the United States Supreme Court limited the extent to
which state sovereignty could protect parties sued under § 1983. See Gerhardt, supra note 7,
at 550-51.
53. See 1A SCHWARTZ, supra note 4,

§ 1.1, at 2-6.

54. See Arthur C. Wallberg, More Than a Defense: Absolute and QualifiedImmunities
of State Ojficials Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, 59 FLA. B.J., June 1995, at 108.
55. See 1A SCHWARTZ, supranote 4, § 1.4, at 13. Remedies are available under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 only when a plaintiff proves a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights
"other than § 1983." See IA SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.4, at 13.
56. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:0, at 4-1.
57. See 1A SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.4, at 13.
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
59. See IA SCHWARTZ, supranote 4, § 5.5, at 490. An official can act under color of state
law even when such actions are in violation of state law. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:70, at
4-40.
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color of state law.60 Beyond officials, other private parties and entities could
61
be found to act under color of state law in the appropriate circumstances.
Section 1983 safeguards against deprivations of federal constitutional or
statutory 62 rights; thus, a violation of rights guaranteed only by state law does
not satisfy the second element of a § 1983 claim.63 If the situation arises where
rights are protected by both federal and state law, a § 1983 claim is valid in
spite of the state law deprivations." Even though § 1983 covers federal
statutory rights, deprivations of those rights may not necessarily give rise to
liability under § 1983 in limited circumstances.65
3.

PartiesCapable of BringingSuit

The language 66 of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been construed broadly to allow
for a multitude of plaintiffs so long as they have the required standing. 67 As to
natural persons, § 1983 applies to citizens as well as noncitizens.68 Regarding
other persons, the right to sue has been extended to corporations, 9
associations, 70 and unions. 7' As to government entities, states may sue in
60. See lA SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 5.5, at 493-94; §5.7, at 506-07.
61. See IA SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 5.4, at 490. For further discussion of when actions
by private parties actions can constitute state action under the Fourteenth Amendment and thus
satisfy the "under color of state law" requirement of § 1983, see RICHEY, supra note 3, §§ 4:444:47, at 4-23 to 4-26.
62. The phrase "secured by the Constitution and laws" found in § 1983 has been
interpreted to include both federal constitutional and statutory rights. See RICHEY, supra note
3, § 4:73, at 4-41 to 4-42.
63. See IA SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 3.1, at 114.
64. See IA SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 3.1, at 116.
65. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:73, at 4-42. "A plaintiff alleging a violation of a federal
statute will be permitted to sue under § 1983 unless (1) the statute does not create enforceable
rights, privileges or immunities with[in] the meaning of § 1983, or (2) Congress has foreclosed
such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself" RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:73, at 4-42.
66. The statute applies to "any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
67. See generally, I SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIviL LBERTIES LITIGATION:
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 1.05, at 7-12 (3d ed. 1991) (outlining the possible plaintiffs under
§ 1983); RICHEY, supra note 3, §§ 4:38-4:42, at 4-22 to 4-23 (discussing who has the right to
sue under § 1983).
68. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:38, at 4-22.
69. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 67, § 1.05, at 8. Regardless of whether the corporation is
for profit or nonprofit, it can assert suit under § 1983 "so long as the corporation is suing in its
own right." I NAHMOD, supra note 67, § 1.05, at 8.
70. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:40, at 4-22. Standing issues do not arise so long as the
association sues for injunctive relief and such relief benefits all injured members of the
association. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:40, at 4-22.
71. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 67, § 1.05, at 9. Labor unions may sue regardless of
whether they are recognized or unrecognized. See I NAHMOD, supra note 67, § 1.05, at 9.
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limited circumstances;72 however, this right has not yet been extended to the
73
United States government nor to local municipalities.
4.

PartiesAmenable to Suit

Proportional to the numerous plaintiffs allowed under § 1983, many
defendants are subject to the remedial force of § 1983. 74 Potential defendants
in a § 1983 claim include any natural person acting under color of state law,75
municipalities,76 and the District of Columbia.7778 Parties79usually immune8 0from
suit include the United States and its officials, states, and territories.
a.

Capacities: Official and Individual

It is essential to establish the capacity in which a state or municipal official
is sued due to the repercussions created by the distinction. 1 The capacities in
72. See I NAHMOD, supranote 67, § 1.05, at 11-12. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
and various district courts in Pennsylvania have allowed the state to sue as parenspatriaeof
its citizens; moreover, the United States Supreme Court adopted this approach in a case
unrelated to § 1983. See I NAHMOD, Supra note 67, § 1.05, at 8-9.
Parenspatriae is "the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care
of themselves .... It is a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign interests
such as health, comfort and welfare of the people.... ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th
ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
73. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:42, at 4-23.
74. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:43, at 4-23.
75. See I NAHMOD,SUpra note 67, § 1.06, at 12-13; supranotes 58-61 and accompanying
text.
76. See I NAHMOD, supra note 67, § 1.06, at 13. Although municipalities are amenable
to suit, their departments are not. See I B SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 7.3, at 14. For further
discussion of municipality liability under § 1983, see infra Part III.C.
77. See I NAHMOD, Supra note 67, § 1.06, at 13-14.
78. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 67, § 1.06, at 15. It is possible to name a federal official
as a defendant in a § 1983 conspiracy action when the official acted under color of state law.
See I NAHMOD, supra note 67, § 1.06, at 15.
79. See RICHEY, supranote 3, § 4:50, at 4-26 to 4-27. States are immune from suit unless
they waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity or if their officials are sued individually for
injunctive' or declaratory relief. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:50, at 4-26 to 4-27. For further
discussion of capacities, see infra Part III.B.4.a. Whether state agencies are covered by the
Eleventh Amendment shield depends upon the function and characteristics of the agency. See
RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:50, at 4-27.
80. See I NAHMOD, supra note 67, § 1.06, at 14.
81. See IA SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 6.5, at 605; see also Karen M. Blum, Local
Government Liability Under Section 1983, 553 PRAC. L. INST. 655, 662-63 (1996). Plaintiffs
should specifically plead in their complaints the capacities in which the defendants are being
sued; furthermore, an official capacity suit should name the government entity only to avoid
confusion. See Blum, supra, at 663. For discussion regarding how the circuit courts of appeal
deal with a complaint without a capacity distinction, see Blum, supra, at 662-63.
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which a defendant official can be sued are official, individual, or both.82 Suing
a defendant in his official capacity is the equivalent of suing the governmental
entity itself.8 3 In an official capacity claim, the plaintiff must meet any
additional burdens of proof usually present in suits against entities; the
defendant, however, can only assert immunities8 4 which would be available to
the entity since the entity is the true defendant in the action. 85 In an individual
capacity claim, the plaintiff sues the defendant personally for deprivations of
the plaintiff's rights under color of state law. 86 Although the plaintiff does not
have to meet any additional burdens of proof when suing an individual
personally, individual capacity
defendants may have a variety of immunity
87
defenses to their advantage.
b.

Immunities: Absolute and Qualified

Individual capacity suits under § 1983 seeking compensatory relief are
subject to the defenses of absolute and qualified immunity. 8 These immunities
are assertable regardless of whether a constitutional violation occurred.8 9
Because these immunities serve as a defense to suit, a denial of immunity is
subject to an interlocutory appeal. 90
Absolute immunity is granted because of long standing common law
protections that insulate an official due to the nature of his position. 9' Courts
readily grant absolute immunity to legislators, judges, prosecutors, witnesses,

82. See 1A SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 6.5, at 604-05.
83. See IA SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 6.5, at 605.
84. For further discussion of immunities, see infra Part III.B.4.b.
85. See 1A SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 6.5, at 605.
86. See Blum, supra note 81, at 662.
87. See IA SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 6.5, at 605.
88. See IB SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 9.1, at 202. These immunities do not apply to
official capacity compensatory actions. See I B SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 9. 1, at 202. Nor
do these immunities apply to injunctive or declaratory actions since such actions attempt to
change or prevent actions of the entity itself (and thus are usually brought in an official
capacity). See IB SCHWARTZ, supranote 4, § 9.1, at 202-03 (citations omitted). "Officials may
enjoy absolute immunity for some of their functions and only qualified immunity for others.
The determination would rest on the historical basis for the absolute immunity, an analysis of
the function and, to some extent, the current public policy implications." Wallberg, supra note
54, at 109.
89. See Wallberg, supra note 54, at 108.
90. See Wallberg, supra note 54, at 110. "As an immunity from suit.... absolute or
qualified immunity would have little value if its denial could only be appealed after trial.
Therefore, an immediate appeal is available from the denial of motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment." Wallberg, supra note 54, at 110. For criticism of the right to
interlocutory appeal, see IB SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 9.13, at 336-37.
91. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:59, at 4-31.
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and jurors,92 so long as the defendant was performing an official action when
he deprived the plaintiff of his rights. 93
Although qualified immunity is more difficult to assert, its scope is more
vast than its absolute counterpart. 94 To assert qualified immunity, a defendant
must show that he did not violate clearly established law of which a reasonable
person should have known.95 One of the most perplexing aspects of this
objective test is the phrase "clearly established law." 96 Although this
requirement is vague, it is clear that the right must be sufficiently established
so that a reasonable official could know that he was violating that right.97
Officials should look to federal constitutional,
statutory, and case law as
98
sources of clearly established law.
C.

Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to Municipalities
1.

MunicipalImmunity

The first major interpretation of municipal liability under § 1983 came
with the decision in Monroe v. Pape.99 After alleging wrongs by defendants
acting under color of state law,"° the petitioners brought suit against Chicago
92. See RiCHEY, supra note 3, § 4:59, at 4-32 to 4-33; Wallberg, supra note 54, at 108.
As to legislative absolute immunity, this privilege has not yet been extended to local legislators.
See RiCHEY, supra note 3, § 4:59, at 4-33. Judicial officers are amenable to suit for injunctive
relief regardless of any immunity. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:59, at 4-33.
93. See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:59, at 4-31.
94. See Wallberg, supra note 54, at 109. Qualified immunity has been granted to law
enforcement officers, prison officials, school officials, administrators of state mental hospitals,
highway agency officials, governors, the president of a state university, and state national guard
officials. See IB SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 9.14, at 339. A policy reason for the defense is
that "officials [with discretionary functions] should be able to act without undue fear in the
performance of their duties." Wallberg, supra note 54, at 109.
95. See Wallberg, supra note 54, at 109. The actual test articulated by the United States
Supreme Court states that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known."
Wallberg, supra note 54, at 109 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
96. See 1B SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 9.13, at 337. The Supreme Court has yet to clarify
the contours of the phrase "clearly established law." See RICHEY, supra note 3, § 4:62, at 4-34;
see also lB SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 9.13, at 337.
97. See Wallberg, supra note 54, at 109. "The particular action need not have been
previously held unlawful, but in light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent."
Wallberg, supra note 54, at 109.
98. See Wallberg, supra note 54, at 109.
99. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
100. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169. The complaint alleged that thirteen Chicago police
officers invaded the petitioners' home in the middle of the night, made the petitioners stand
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police officers and the city itself.'° ' The United States Supreme Court
extensively analyzed the legislative history behind the Civil Rights Act of 1871
and held that a cause of action against the individual officers was valid;
however, the Court held the City of Chicago was immune from suit. 1 2 The
Court deemed the officers' alleged actions as taken under color of state law. 3
As to the city itself, congressional rejection of the Sherman Amendment to the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was determinative to the Court's decision.'"
Considering this legislative history, the Monroe majority held that Congress
did not intend for "persons" under § 1983 to include municipalities.0 5
Municipalities were then officially immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.106

2.

Municipal Liability: The Reversal of Monroe

In 1978, the Court in Monell v. Departmentof Social Services'0 7 overruled
Monroe and held that municipalities were amenable to suit under § 1983.'08
The Court reanalyzed the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and
concluded that Congress had intended to include municipalities as suable
naked in the living room, searched the house without a warrant, and detained Mr. Monroe for
ten hours at the police station while questioning him about a two-day-old murder. See id.
While at the police station, the officers never offered Mr. Monroe the benefit of counsel, the
opportunity to speak with a family member, nor did they bring him before an available
magistrate. See id.
101. See id. at 170, 192.
102. See id. at 192.
103. See id. at 187, 192. The Court interpreted "under color of state law" as "[m]isuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of state law." Monroe, 365
U.S. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Under this
construction, it was clear that the alleged officers' acts were within the remedial measures of
§ 1983; accordingly, the Monroes had a valid cause of action against the individual officers.
See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
104. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191. Proposed by Senator Sherman of Ohio, the Sherman
Amendment would have created municipal liability for acts of violence occurring within a
municipality's borders; moreover, the amendment required full compensation to the person
damaged by the violence. See id. at 188. "The Sherman Amendment would have in effect
placed an obligation upon local governments to keep the peace." Cushman, supra note 41, at
699.
105. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
106. See id. at 187. "The result limited compensation for victims whose constitutional
rights had been violated, because they could not reach the deep pockets of the governmental
treasury." Cushman, supra note 41, at 699.
107. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
108. See id. at 690. At issue was the official policy of both the New York Department of
Social Services and Board of Education, which forced pregnant women to take unnecessary
leaves of absence. See id. at 660-61.
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"persons."' 9 As a limit on this newfound liability, the Court rejected the
0 To hold a municipality
theory of respondeat superior liability.o"
liable under
§ 1983, the Court required that plaintiffs show either a municipal policy or
custom caused the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights."' This policy or custom
requirement essentially created a third element to § 1983 suits against
municipalities; however, the Court refrained from detailing the requisite steps
to proving policy or custom.1 2 These determinations would surface only with
the development of Monell's progeny.
3.

The Development of MunicipalLiability: Post-Monell

In Owen v. City ofIndependence 13 and City ofNewport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc.,' '4 the Supreme Court answered whether single acts by officials could
satisfy the policy requirements of Monell."5 Owen involved a city council's
discharge of the Chief of Police without a hearing," 6 while FactConcerts, Inc.
involved a city's cancellation of a contract." 7 Although these decisions are
most frequently cited for other principles,'" the Supreme Court has cited these
cases to illustrate that a single decision by a municipal legislative body, though
not intended to be generally applicable, is policy for the purposes of municipal
liability.119
The next series of cases forced the Supreme Court to address the questions
of who a municipal policymaker is and when their actions can impose liability
on a municipality for purposes of § 1983. Analogous to Owen and Fact

109. See id. at 665-90.
110. See id. at 691. The language of § 1983 mandates that municipal liability will be
imposed only when the entity caused a deprivation of federal rights. See id. at 692.
111. See id. at 690-91. See also I NAHMOD, supra note 67, § 6.07, at 420-25 (discussing
applications of the Monell policy and custom requirements); lB SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 7.6,
at 19-24 (analyzing various treatments of the policy requirement).
112. See Cushman, supra note 41, at 702-03. For criticism of the Monell decision, see
Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 541 (implying that the Monell decision represented judicial activism).
113. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
114. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
115. See Board of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1389 (discussing under
what circumstances the Supreme Court has previously held a single act to be policy).
116. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 627-29.
117. See Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. at 249-52.
118. See !BSCHWARTZ,supra note 4, §§ 7.1-7.2, at 2-13. "A combined reading of Owen
and City of Newport leads to the conclusions that, while municipal entities are not immune from
prospective relief or compensatory damages, even when their officials act in good faith (Owen),
they are absolutely immune from punitive damages (City ofNewport)." lB SCHWARTZ, supra
note 4, § 7.1, at 2.
119. See Brown, 117 S.Ct. at 1389; see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
480-81 (1986).
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Concerts,Inc., a plurality in Pembaurv. City of Cincinnati'20 held that a single
decision, when made by the appropriate authority, could subject the municipality to § 1983 liability.12' A plurality of the Court also held that municipalities
can only be held liable for the decisions of their officials when those officials
have final, and not simply discretionary, authority to establish policy with
respect to the unconstitutional action ordered.' 22 Further, the plurality directed
that lower courts should look to state law in determining
whether an official
23
possessed final authority as to establishing policy.
24 a plurality of the Court adhered
In City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,1
to the
Pembaurdecision in holding that state law should determine who policymakers
are for purposes of § 1983; however, the Praprotnikplurality went beyond25
Pembaurand held that state law is the sole source for such a determination.126
Further, such a determination is to be made by the court rather than a jury.
Less than one year after the Praprotnikdecision, the Supreme Court had
27
the chance to restructure its much criticized definition of policymaker1
Justice Kennedy joined the Praprotnikplurality 28 in deciding Jett v. Dallas
Independent School District.'29 The majority in Jett reaffirmed the Praprotnik
plurality's holding that final policymaking authority is a question of state law;
however, the Jett majority implicitly rejected
the assertion that state law was
30
the sole determining factor in the analysis.
An important addition to the Monell policy or custom requirements came
3
from the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton v. Harris,1
1 involving an

120. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
121. See id. at 481-85 (plurality opinion).
122. See id. at 481-82 (plurality opinion). The Court noted that such authority could be
found in either a legislative enactment or through a delegation from an official who possesses
such authority. See id. at 483 (plurality opinion).
123. See id. at 483 (plurality opinion). At issue was whether the prosecutor was a final
policymaker when he instructed two deputies to forcibly enter the plaintiff's clinic. See id. at
484 (plurality opinion). Because Ohio state law allowed a prosecutor to establish policy, the
prosecutor was found to be a policymaker with final authority and the municipality was
accordingly liable. See id. at 484-85 (plurality opinion).
124. 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (plurality opinion).
125. See id. at 124-25 (plurality opinion). For further discussion and criticism of the
Praprotnikdecision, see Cushman, supra note 41, at 694; Gerhardt, supra note 7, 577-79.
126. See Praprotnik,485 U.S. at 124-25 (plurality opinion).
127. See I NAHMOD, supra note 67, § 6.10, at 447.
128. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 67, § 6.10, at 447.
129. 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
130. See id. at 737; 1 NAHMOD, supra note 67, §6.10, at 447-48. In determining whether
someone has final policymaking authority, trial judges should look to the "[r]elevant legal
materials, including state and local positive law" as well as custom having the effect of law.
Jett, 491 U.S. at 737 (citing Praprotnik,485 U.S. at 124 n.1).
131. 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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inadequate training claim against the city.'32 The Court noted that the typical
Monell policy or custom theories were not sufficient for the plaintiff because
the actual policy at issue was constitutional.'33 When such policies are
unconstitutionally applied by an employee as a result of the employee's
inadequate training, a municipality can be held liable so long as the plaintiff
can show that the municipality was deliberately indifferent to the rights of the
persons coming into contact with the municipal employee. "
The Harris Court's adoption of the deliberately indifferent standard
illustrated a method of imposing liability on a municipality even when the
municipality's actions were constitutional. In Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown,135 the deliberate indifference standard in the context of a
single hiring decision was destined to again play a decisive role in determining
municipal liability under § 1983.
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 3 6 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a single hiring decision could
trigger municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' 3 After suffering a defeat
in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the petitioner, the Board of the County
Commissioners, argued something more than a single decision to hire is
necessary to hold a municipality liable for a plaintiff's constitutional injuries
that were caused by a municipal employee. 38 The United States Supreme
132. See id. at 387 (plurality opinion). While in the custody of the Canton police
department, Geraldine Harris repeatedly collapsed to the floor. See id. at 381 (plurality
opinion). She brought suit against the City of Canton for failure to train its supervisors in
making determinations whether an arrestee needed medical attention while in custody. See id.
at 381 (plurality opinion).
133. See id. at 386-87 (plurality opinion). "There can be little doubt that on its face the
city's policy regarding medical treatment for detainees is constitutional." Id. (plurality
opinion).
134. See id. at 387-89 (plurality opinion). "Only where a municipality's failure to train its
employees in a relevant respect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of its
inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city 'policy or custom' that is
actionable under § 1983." Id. at 389 (plurality opinion).
135. 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).
136. 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).
137. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1387. The decision to hire Bums was constitutional, and it
complied with state law. See id. at 1387, 1389; supra note 24 and accompanying text.
138. See Petitioner's Brief at 9-12, Brown (No. 95-1100). Petitioner argued:
Sheriff Moore's deliberate indifference may have caused the constitutional violation
in a "but for" sense, but it did not directly 'order' or 'authorize' the violation.
Where the policymaker's decision does not directly 'order' or 'authorize' the
constitutional violation, something more than a single decision is required in order
to find that this decision in fact constitutes 'municipal policy' such that we can hold
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Court agreed and held that only when a reasonable policymaker could
determine that the specific constitutional deprivations caused by an employee
decision could a municipalwere the plainly obvious consequence of the hiring
39
ity be held liable for its single hiring decision.
After indicating that a municipality remained subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,141 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that a
municipality cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.1 4'
Rather, Monell and its progeny require a plaintiff seeking compensation under
or unofficial custom of the municipality
§ 1983 to prove that an official policy 42
directly caused the plaintiff's injury.1
In resolving whether a municipality could be liable for a single hiring
decision by an official policymaker, the Court cautioned that it is insufficient
for a plaintiff to show that the single decision is imputable to the
municipality.14 3 The plaintiff must also show that the municipality's deliberate
conduct was the moving force'" causing the plaintiff's injuries. 145 Such proof
satisfies the need to establish the municipality's requisite culpability 146 and
causation; moreover, it forces courts to look beyond the doctrine of respondeat
superior when determining municipal liability. 147 The Court reasoned that
the county liable ....
Id. at 11-12 (quoting Brown v. Bryan County Okla., 67 F.3d 1174, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1995)
(Garza, J., dissenting)).
139. SeeBrown, 117 S. Ct. at 1386, 1391-92.
140. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1387-88 (citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 689 (1978)).
141. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1388 (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
818 (1985) (plurality opinion); id. at 828 (Brennan, J., concurring); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1986); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 122
(1988) (plurality opinion); id. at 137 (Brennan, J., concurring); City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
142. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1388. As opposed to respondeat superior, under which a
municipality would be liable solely because of the employer-employee relationship, the
necessity of finding a "policy" ensures an actual adoption or endorsement of the act by an
appropriate legislative or decision making body. See id. The Court also noted that "an act
performed pursuant to a 'custom' that has not been formally approved by an appropriate
decision maker... "may still allow an imposition of liability under § 1983 so long as the
"practice is so widespread as to have the force of law." Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91
(internal citations omitted)).
143. SeeBrown, 117 S. Ct. at 1388.
144. The phrase "moving force" is an alternative way of emphasizing that a municipality's
policy, custom, or deliberate indifference was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
See I B SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 7.12, at 36.
145. SeeBrown, 117 S. Ct. at 1388.
146. See id. Culpability should be examined in any § 1983 analysis; however, § 1983
"itself 'contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation'
of an underlying federal right." Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986)).
147. SeeBrown, 117 S. Ct. at 1388.
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requiring some affirmative link prevented
a finding of municipal liability from
14
implicating federalism questions. 1
Establishing a municipality's culpability and causation is easier when the
municipality itself intentionally acted to injure a plaintiff; 4 9 attribution is much
more difficult and -the risk of imposing vicarious liability is greater when a
municipality's actions, though facially constitutional, indirectly result in an
injury or deprivation of federally protected rights.5 0 Such is the case of a
single hiring decision.' The majority held that a plaintiff may bring a cause
of action against a municipality only when the two following conditions are
met: first, the acts of a municipal employee caused a violation of the plaintiff's
civil rights; and second, the municipality was deliberately indifferent 52 to the
known or obvious consequences of its actions."5 3 Therefore, a municipal actor,
such as the hiring sheriff in the present case, can only be deemed deliberately
indifferent when the actual deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional
rights
54
will be the plainly obvious consequence of his hiring decision.1
148. See id. at 1394. Underlying Justice O'Connor's reasoning is her awareness of
federalism concerns. If the Court had elected to hold Bryan County liable for the single hiring
decision by Sheriff Moore which was permitted by state law, then the Court in essence would
be taking it upon itself to rewrite the Oklahoma statutes governing the hiring of law
enforcement officials. See id.
149. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1389. The Court stated:
[P]roof that a municipality's .

.

. authorized decision maker has intentionally

deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the
municipality acted culpably. Similarly, the conclusion that the action taken or
directed by the municipality or its authorized decision maker itself violates federal
law will also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the
injury of which the plaintiff complains.
Id.

150. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1388-89. When a municipality's actions indirectly injure or
deprive a plaintiff of her rights, extreme standards of culpability and causation must be applied
in order to prevent municipal liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is not
permitted under Monell. See id. Justice O'Connor noted that the Court has only extended
liability to single decisions imputable to a municipality "where the evidence that the
municipality had acted and that the plaintiff had suffered a deprivation of federal rights also
proved fault and causation." Id. at 1389 (citing Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980);
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)).
151. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1393-94.
152. The Court defines "deliberate indifference" as "a stringent standard of fault, requiring
proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action."
Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1391.
153. See id. at 1390 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
154. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392. Justice O'Connor reasoned that although inadequate
scrutiny during the hiring process may increase the risk of harmful consequences, this will not
satisfy the standard of deliberate indifference which requires that the plaintiff show such
inadequate screening will produce a specific constitutional violation. See id. at 1391. Because
of the significance of the test enunciated by the Court, it is stated below in full:
Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would lead a reasonable
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Justice O'Connor found that the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals misapplied the deliberate indifference standard. 5 ' The lower
courts' analysis in essence relied on a preponderance of the evidence standard56
that such inadequate screening would produce any constitutional violation. 1
Justice O'Connor determined that the lower courts erred in failing to address
whether Bums's hiring, given his background, would make the specific
constitutional violation alleged in this case, excessive force, a plainly obvious
consequence of Moore's hiring decision.'57 Because the Court found
insufficient evidence that Bums's infliction of excessive force was a plainly
obvious consequence of the hiring decision, it also found that Sheriff Moore
did not act with deliberate indifference to the rights of the Plaintiff and that the
58
district court thus erred in submitting the inadequate hiring claim to the jury.
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, dissented from the
majority's holding. 5 9 Souter criticized the majority for creating a new standard
of proof for deliberate indifference by requiring plaintiffs to show that a
deprivation of a specific constitutional right was the plainly obvious consequence of a single hiring decision.' 6 Even under this heightened standard of
proof, Souter found there was sufficient evidence to 61hold Bryan County liable
for its policymaker's decision to hire Stacy Bums.'
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, also dissented
from the majority's holding. 62 Breyer questioned the ever-developing
distinctions set forth in Monell between respondeat superior liability and
policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire
the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected right can
the official's failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant's background constitute
'deliberate indifference.'
Id. at 1392.
155. SeeBrown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392.
156. Seeid.
157. See id. The lower courts should have analyzed whether "this officer was highly likely
to inflict the particularinjury suffered by the plaintiff." Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392 (emphasis
added).
158. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1393.
159. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1394 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 1397 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter chastised the majority for
redefining the deliberate indifference standards of Canton in which the Court construed
"constitutional violations generally." See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter further
argued against establishment of the new standard due to the fact that the petitioner had not
requested such action by the Court. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 1398-1400 (Souter, J., dissenting). During oral arguments, "Souter
postulated that the hiring decision set in motion a chain of events that resulted in Brown's
constitutional rights being violated." Daniel J. Roy, High Court Scrutinizes County's Liability
for Reserve Officer's Civil Rights Violations, EML. POL'Y & L. DAILY (BNA), at D-4
(November 7, 1996).
162. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1401 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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liability that is based on a municipality's policy or custom.'63 Breyer asserted
that the need for the distinction has diminished," 6 the complexity of its
application has increased,'65 and factual and legal changes have developed that
may no longer require the distinction.'66 As a result, Breyer believed that the
time was at hand to reexamine the basic principles set forth in Monell, and he
67
therefore dissented from the ongoing application of the Monell distinctions. 1

163. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 1401-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer pointed out that the original
basis for the Monell distinction was that Congress had rejected the Sherman Amendment to the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, which essentially would have allowed vicarious municipal liability
for the acts of private citizens. See id. at 1401 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted);
Cushman, supra note 41, at 699; supra note 104 and accompanying text. Justice Breyer argued
that such a rejection does not pertain to vicarious liability for the acts of a municipality's
employees. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1401-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
165. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1401-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Using the jury instruction
in the case at bar as an example, Justice Breyer noted that extremely slight differences in
wording creates vastly different results. "Yet those words, while adding complexity, do not
seem to reflect a difference that significantly helps one understand the difference between
'vicarious' liability and 'policy."' Id. at 1402 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
166. See id. at 1401, 1403-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer relied on the following three
arguments: first, the sheer complexity of both interpretive law and legal distinctions makes it
difficult for a municipality to have a clear understanding of what "policy" means; second,
municipalities have more at stake in a lawsuit since individual employees have the protection
of "qualified immunity;" and third, many states have enacted statutes that in essence create
respondeat superior liability through the indemnification of their municipal employees. See id.
at 1403-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 1404 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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V. SIGNIFICANCE

Commentators both commended 68 and criticized' 69 the Brown decision.
Wallace Jefferson, attorney for the petitioner, heralded the decision as
beneficial to taxpayers due to the Court's restrictions on municipal liability for
hiring decisions.170 The respondent's attorney, J. Kermit Hill, cautioned that
1 71
the decision suggests that municipalities are not accountable for their actions.
Regardless of such praise and criticism, the decision solidified some of the
Court's previous views, raised a variety of interesting legal intricacies, and left
some questions open to speculation until future decisions determine their
outcome.
One of the primary results from Brown is that the Court reasserted its
federalism concerns regarding respondeat superior liability. 172 After noting that
the Court has yet to import respondeat superior theories into questions of
municipal liability, 73 the Court addressed the difficult task of balancing the
traditional rules within the sphere of single hiring decisions. 74 The Court held
that municipalities can only be held liable when a plaintiff proves the
following: first, a municipal employee violated the plaintiff's constitutional
rights; and second, the specific constitutional violation was a plainly obvious
consequence of the hiring decision. '7 The rationale for its newly enunciated
rule lies within the need to prove both a municipality's culpability and
168. See Chris Casteel, Court Backs Bryan County, Reverses $818,000 Ruling, THE DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, April 29, 1997, at 01 (statement of petitioner's attorney, Wallace B. Jefferson)
(suggesting that without the decision, many municipalities throughout the country might be
"more vulnerable to lawsuits over hiring decisions and might be forced into bankruptcy by large
judgments"); Savage, supra note 12, at Al (statement of Los Angeles City Attorney James K.
Hahn) (suggesting that the decision could reinstate "the original purpose of civil rights laws-as
tools against government entities that systematically violate civil rights, rather than as vehicles
to sue over occasional police brutality").
169. See Steven P. Garmisa, High Court Creates Civil Rights Thicket, Cm. SUN-TIMES,
May 21, 1997, at 68 (asserting that the "majority championed the right of municipal officials
to hire relatives with criminal records"); Green Light for Brutality, supra note 18, at 36A
(declaring the Court's judicial activism in effect "issued local governments a license for
negligence"); Incoherence at the Court, RICHMOND.TIMES-DISPATCH, May 16, 1997, at A 12
(calling the decision "aimless meandering"); James Kilpatrick, Case of Wayward Nephew
"Murkfies" Law Even Further, THE ST. J. REG. (Springfield, I11.), June 3, 1997, at 4
(suggesting that the decision further obscures municipal liability litigation); US. Supreme Court
Ruling Lets Too Many OffHook, SYRACUSE HERALD J., April 29, 1997, at A 10 (labeling the
decision as ridiculous).
170. See Savage, supra note 12, A1.
171. See Savage, supra note 12, A1.
172. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1394.
173. See id. at 1388 (citations omitted).
174. See id. at 1388-94.
175. See id. at 1392.
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causation. 17 6 A plaintiff who satisfies this burden thus proves the municipality
was deliberately indifferent to his rights,'77 and any questions concerning
federalism and respondeat superior liability simply evaporate. 7 '
Brown is important also because the Court further clarified its deliberate
indifference analysis set forth in Canton.7 9 The Canton deliberate indifference
standard required a plaintiff to show that a municipality shut its eyes to
constitutional violations in general.180 By holding that the specific violation of
the plaintiffs civil rights must be the plainly obvious consequence of the
standard
municipality's actions,' 81 the Court arguably created a higher requisite
82
indifference.
deliberate
municipality's
a
for suits involving
Another result of Brown is that its "plainly obvious consequence" test
could be applicable to a smorgasbord of constitutional violations. 8 3 The test
only requires that the specific constitutional violation be plainly obvious at the
time of hiring. ' 4 Because the Court did not restrict this test to excessive force
claims or to claims involving single hiring decisions, plaintiffs seeking to
redress any constitutional deprivation by showing a municipality's deliberate
85
indifference must now satisfy Brown's "plainly obvious consequence" test. 1
Although the Brown majority held that Bryan County and Sheriff Moore
were not deliberately indifferent to Brown's constitutional rights, and thus not
liable, 18 6 the Court left open the question of whether a single hiring decision
176. See id. at 1394.
177. See id. at 1392.
178. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1394.
179. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1397 (Souter, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 1397 (Souter, J., dissenting); supra note 160 and accompanying text.
181. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392.
182. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1397 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Andrew J. Ruzicho &
Louis A. Jacobs, Vicarious Municipal Liability, 20 EMPL. PRAC. 113, 115 (1997) (stating that
Brown increased the burden of proof in cases of inadequate screening); Casteel, supra note 168,
at 01 (statement of petitioner's attorney, Wallace B. Jefferson) ("I think it just makes a plaintiff
have to show with a stricter burden of proof that the city or county violated the Constitution.").
But see Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1392-93 n. I (majority opinion) ("We do not suggest that a plaintiff
in an inadequate screening case must show a higher degree of culpability than the 'deliberate
indifference' required in Canton ... ").
183. See High Court Makes It Harder to Successfully Sue Municipalities Over Police
Brutality, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), April 29, 1997, at 04A (suggesting that the
Brown decision could impact any suit based on deprivation of federal rights); Savage, supra
note 12, at A l (asserting that the Brown decision could impact various areas of the law such as
discriminatory hiring suits, search and seizure cases, sexual harassment claims, and free-speech
violations).
184. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392.
185. See Norris ex rel. West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
337 (1997) (holding municipality not liable for sexual harassment of thirteen-year-old female
by police officer, because such harassment was not plainly obvious even though officer had a
history of sexually assaulting adult women).
186. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1394.
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could ever trigger municipal liability."8 7 In the past, plaintiffs have had little
success with claims based on hiring inadequacies.8 8 In light of the history of
hiring claims under § 1983 and the stringent test set forth in Brown, it is
doubtful that litigants claiming inadequate screening will have increased
chances of success in the near future.
J. Matthew Mauldin

187. See id. at 1392; see also Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1416 (5th
Cir. 1997) (recognizing the Court's reluctance to "announce a bright-line rule that municipal
officials can never be liable under § 1983 for an isolated hiring decision...").
188. See I B SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 7.18, at 1!1. Even prior to the Brown decision,
Schwartz noted the deliberate indifference standard generally proved insurmountable. See lB
SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 7.18, at I11.

